BOKO HARAM: Who are they? How do they operate? How can they be contained?
Al Qaeda’s
spectacular success in the 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA
emboldened Mohamed Yusuf, a Nigerian radical cleric to create his own terrorist
movement which is more commonly known by the name “Boko Haram”. Its members
find the latter name, which is a combination of Hausa (Boko to mean western
education) and Arabic (Haram to mean “sin” or “is forbidden”)[1],
pejorative and will prefer to be called “Jama‐’at ahl al‐sunna li’l‐da’wa
wa’l‐jihad” (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad).
Mohamed Yusuf,
who died in a Nigerian prison in 2009, and his followers practice the Sunni
branch of Islam, but since his death and replacement by Abubakar Shekau[2],
the movement has grown radical and now kills even Muslims in its bid to achieve
its aims at all costs, aims which include the creation of an Islamic caliphate
around its operating base in the North East of Nigeria. They have so far proven
to be ready to stop at nothing, including international boundaries separating
Nigeria from Cameroon, Chad and Niger and as students of Armament and Security,
it will be interesting to understand how such a threat to security has been
able to establish itself and grow to such proportions[3]
in spite of the Nigerian army, and today, that of Chad and Cameroon. Is it enough, to use the argument of
asymmetry to justify the fact that some 15,000 improvised fighters can kill
more than 10,000 and displace more than 1,500,000[4]
people over the year 2014, when faced with one of the biggest armies in Africa,
with a total force of 90,000 troops according to Time Magazine?
If no, what
other arguments can be advanced to justify the success of this group which is nevertheless
decried and has been condemned worldwide. How is it that, despite the summit of
Paris in May 2014, during which the Presidents of Benin, Cameroon, Chad,
Nigeria and Niger met with the French president to declare war on Boko Haram,
the movement has instead become a stronger force, or at least a much more
murderous one? How does it achieve wealth, arms, etc? All these questions
kindle our interest as students in strategy, peace and development studies and
can be handled through the consultation of documentary sources.
In the following
work therefore, our intention is to briefly examine what are the strategies
used by such an internal but internationalised armed threat to security, and
what strategies have been or need to be put in place to contain its threat to
peace and security, in general and the stability of the Lake Chad Basin region
in particular. These shall consist in Part I and Part II of the work.
Part I: Boko Haram’s operating
strategy
I.1: Brief History: The Rise of
Boko Haram in Nigeria
According to
John Ford[5],
Boko Haram’s roots date far back in the 1970s with Maitatsine, a radical cleric
who preached violent hatred against the Nigerian state and was killed in 1982,
but his ideology, of returning the whole northern Nigeria back to Sharia rule
and of never reading any book except the Koran, lived on. The States of Borno
and Zamfara, Boko Haram strongholds, have the lowest school attendance in
Nigeria with only 21% of the population attending school in 2010[6].
As said above, the rise of terrorism as a much more powerful global threat
following the spectacular success of the September 11 attacks gave this
movement impetus, coupled to the return of democracy in Nigeria which signified
greater regional autonomy but also a different focus of the central power,
giving room for the local authorities to be challenged by such movements,
including MEND, Bakassi Freedom Fighters, Ansaru[7],
etc.
Boko Haram,
though radical, had remained rather peaceful.
According to Minteh[8],
in 2004, the United States’ State Department investigated the group but did not
find them to be a threat. However,
things got to a head when it refused in 2009 that motorcycle riders should not
wear crash helmets because it is un-Islamic, leading to a clash with government
forces that killed 800 people. Mohamed Yusuf was arrested and died, probably
summarily executed and this incident is not without an impact in the
radicalisation of the group, since Shakau is much more blood thirsty and once
declared “I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill, the way I enjoy
killing chickens and rams[9].”
The fact that Boko Haram keeps killing more with each passing year is proof of
this violence. This enables us to turn our attention to the modus operandi of
the organisation.
I.2: How does Boko Haram Operate?
As students of
strategy, peace, security and armament, it will be very interesting to
describe, through analysis of documentary sources, the modus operandi of the
organisation, in view of demonstrating how it has been able to pose such a
global challenge and the difficulty faced by authorities both in Nigeria and
internationally in containing the organisation.
Like other
Terrorist groups, for Boko Haram to obtain its aims, it targets its enemies
like the governments of the Lake Chad Basin countries to force concessions out
of them, and its own population, to ensure that it continues to give it support
and potential recruits.
I.2.1. Attrition
Attrition is a strategy aimed at convincing
the enemy that Boko Haram has power, can cause damage and so force governments
to give in. According to Kidd et Al, “The
most important task for any terrorist group is to persuade the enemy that the
group is strong and resolute enough to inflict serious costs, so that the enemy
yields to the terrorists’ demands. The
attrition strategy is designed to accomplish this task”. Some of the
following terrorist tactics fall under the attrition strategy.
Figure 1. Strategies of Terrorist Violence, Adapted from Kid et al
Target
of Persuasion
|
Intimidation
|
|
Attrition
|
|
|
|
Outbidding
|
|
Provocation
|
|
Spoiling
|
Trust worthiness
I.2.2. Intimidation
This strategy is
used by the terrorist group against their own population. Kidd Et Al. describe
intimidation as being “akin to the
strategy of deterrence, preventing some undesired behaviour by means of threats
and costly signals. It is most frequently used when terrorist organizations
wish to overthrow a government in power or gain social control over a given
population. It works by demonstrating that the terrorists have the power to
punish whoever disobeys them, and that the government is powerless to stop them[10]”.
This could explain why Boko Haram recently slaughtered even Muslims when it
attacked on 05/02/2015 in Fotokol, Northern Cameroon, although it can simply be
said that Boko Haram’s interests are no longer merely religious, that is why it
can afford to anger Muslims too.
I.2.3. Provocation
Kidd et al see
provocation as a strategy designed to “persuade
the domestic audience that the target of attacks is evil and untrustworthy and
must be vigorously resisted[11]”.
For example, although Boko Haram has enjoyed sympathy with the Kanuris, Hausas
and other Muslim tribes in the North of Nigeria, they are unwilling to kill and
bomb Christians, churches and government officials from the South. The
procedure is to provoke the government to such an extent that it engages in a
violent, kinetic military response that will penalise the population and
radicalise them. Boko Haram seems to have had a lot of success in Nigeria with
this strategy since the Nigerian military, seeking an easy solution has been
involved in massive human rights abuses, indiscriminate killings, torture, etc.
while at the same time imposing a state of emergency, communications and IT
black out, etc. all bringing untold hardship to moderates, some of which will
likely join Boko Haram.
I.2.4. Spoiling
The same authors
above describe spoiling as aimed at “persuading the enemy that moderates on the
terrorists’ side cannot be trusted to abide by a peace deal. Whenever two sides
negotiate a peace agreement, there is uncertainty about whether the deal is
self-enforcing. Each side fears that even if it honours its commitments, the
other side may not, catapulting it back to war on disadvantageous terms”.
Possibly, this took place but is unconfirmed when the Nigerian Government
announced that they were negotiating a release of the Chibok girls kidnapped by
Boko Haram. It is possible that one branch of the terrorist organisation had
negotiated with the Nigerian government while another went ahead to perpetrate
attacks to destroy the nascent peace. However, this remains to be proven.
I.2.5. Outbidding
Outbidding is
also a strategy but so far, internal wrangles in Boko Haram are not yet public
enough for any example of outbidding to be confirmed. It occurs only when two
rival terrorist factions are competing for the allegiance of the population,
like the Fatah and Hamas in Palestine. One may carry out a terrorist attack of
the enemy not because they have any concession to force from the enemy but just
to convince the neutral population to support the terrorist organisation
against its rival.
Map of Nigeria showing the scope
of Boko Haram operations
Source: Copied from Open Street Map, accessed at https://abagond.wordpress.com/2014/05/09/boko-haram/ on 23/02/2015.
Notice the sheer length of Cameroon’s border
with Nigeria and why, despite this length, cross border attacks by Boko Haram
in Cameroon are concentrated in the Far North, just adjacent to the Nigerian
States of Borno and Zamfara. A glance at this map will also explain why Niger
and Chad are involved. According to Radio France Internationale, Boko Haram now
controls more than 20,000[12]
square km in Norther Nigeria, a land area equal to that held by ISIL in Syria
and Iraq.
I.3. Some Boko Haram tactics
While strategies and not tactics
constituted the main thrust of our work, it is interesting to briefly examine
the tactics used by the organisation which constitute its main thrust.
i.
Acquisition of popular support
through legitimate grievances
This takes us to
the very origins of the group. Created in Maiduguri in 2002, Boko Haram started
as a youth group that condemned vices like corruption among Nigeria’s leaders.
The organization attracted community support and membership by providing
community aid (i.e.- free food, shelter, etc.)[13].
This enabled it to gain widespread sympathy among the poor Muslim communities
in the North of Nigeria but it also played on tribalism to recruit Hausas,
Kanuri and other peoples of the region.
ii.
Kidnappings and hostage taking
Kidnapping,
hijacking and similar tactics are very popular with terrorists and other forms
of organised crime or rebellions against authority. Boko Haram’s most
mediatised kidnapping is that of 276 school girls in Chibok, on April 15/16
2014 but it has also kidnapped foreigners and nationals, for example, in
Cameroon, including Chinese workers, missionaries, etc. especially from Western
countries. This is a way of exacting ransom from the governments of those
kidnapped but also, of proving to these countries that they are vulnerable,
that their citizens can be attacked.
iii.
Arson and cold blooded killings
Boko Haram often
attacks public edifices like the UN headquarters in Abuja on 26/08/2011,
churches, police and army stations, mosques, markets, etc. Such attacks are
claimed even if they were done by someone else because they show that the
terrorist group can strike somewhere hitherto thought to be safe and so this
compels not only the government to negotiate but also, Boko Haram’s own
supporters to belief in and obey their commanders, given the results they
achieve.
iv.
Guerrilla warfare
Another
component of the attrition strategy is the guerrilla or hit and run tactic. It
simply means to strike when the enemy is vulnerable and to escape when
vulnerable. It has proven a very effective tactic in all sorts of asymmetric
wars and has been used in the 20th Century by Mao Tse, the Vietcong,
Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, among other freedom fighters. Almost
all Boko Haram skirmishes or battles with the armyies of the countries involved
have a touch of guerrilla.
v.
Gender based violence
Apart from
kidnapping girls which they claim to sell off as brides and domestic workers,
Boko Haram has also started making increasing use of women, not only because of
the misogyny of their religious beliefs but because there is too much pressure
on their male fighters and they need more operatives.
vi.
Suicide bombings and car
bombings
Suicide
terrorism, one of the most formidable weapons of terrorism as demonstrated
during September 2001, has increasingly been used by this movement. According
to Obi and Ezeogu, “Though there is no
clarity with the ideological aims, goals or objectives of this sect, but its
acceptance of suicide terrorism in their struggle has become great issues of
concern”[14].
Land mines and
explosive devices have also been used, for example, to hinder the mobility of
Cameroons troops. Boko Haram is also feared to use such furtive techniques like
infiltration of terrorist camps to gather intelligence and prepare attacks.
Part II: Containing Boko Haram
As the map
below shows, the three Northern regions of Cameroon have become danger zones,
although obviously the danger does not only target foreigners. Dignitaries are
not spared since these can be ransomed but these fare better than any other
convenient victim who will be simply slaughtered to spread the message of the
terrorists’ cruelty or to show that they are not bluffing. Initially, Cameroon’s policy towards Boko
Haram, despite all sorts of provocation, had been to remain patient and try to
prevent Boko Haram from violating its territory, but so far, this has not
worked. It is now left for the country to embark on a more offensive strategy.
Cameroon has therefore been unwilling dragged into a war, alongside Chad and
Niger. They are thus compelled to look for counter terrorism and anti-terrorism
strategies together.
Map showing zones considered
highly dangerous for expatriates to travel to.
It is important
to note at this juncture that containment depends on the attacking strategy.
This said, we may be inclined to reason along with some who hold that “le principal avantage des combattants de Boko Haram est leur fluidité. N’ importe qui peut adhérer ou agir au
nom de Boko Haram, ils n’ont pas de grand besoins logistiques et ils
sont très mobiles. Cela leur permet d’être
évasifs, de se fondre dans le décor, et de mener des opérations rapides et de se replier aussi
rapidemen[15]t”. In other words, what we
call furtive war, guerrilla and asymmetry. This said, we may want to agree with
Okoli and Iortyer who recommend a “paradigm
shift from anti-terrorism to strategic counterterrorism as the way forward[16]”.
But before we examine this in detail, we may want to look at how the fight
has gone so far in view of identifying where the fight can be improved.
II.1. How has Containment been
done so far?
II.1.1. Strategy in Nigeria
So far,
Nigeria’s moves against Boko Haram have only enabled the movement to grow from
strength to strength. The country is accused of adopting a kinetic approach, a
mechanical military move better suited to symmetrical or dissymmetrical warfare
but not to asymmetry. It has imposed a state of emergency, imposed
communications blackouts, and swept through infested regions with torture and
summary killings. However, some have accused Nigeria’s army of having
accomplices with Boko Haram, while others accuse its President, Goodluck
Jonathan of neglecting the fight against the movement for reasons of political
expediency (if the movement continues, northerners are unlikely to turn out to
vote against him). This may no longer hold valid since the elections have been
postponed, but the fact that the Nigerian military promises to clean the
country of Boko Haram means that they may underestimate the versatility of the
movement.
Secondly, we
may want to observe that in the past, the Nigerian government and Cameroon have
traded mutual accusations faced with Cameroon’s refusal to allow Nigeria the
right of hot pursuit into its territory. Cameroon on its part has accused
Nigeria of abandoning territory to the terrorist group which uses it as rear
grounds from which to make forays into Cameroon.
II.1.2. Strategy in Cameroon and Chad
These countries
have deployed fully to the war front.
Cameroon has 8700 fighters at the front in the Far North province that
had, hither to, concentrated on watching out against attacks and reacting. It
became necessary for the strategy to shift towards attack, hence the deployment
of bomber aircraft to attack the militant’s positions from the air.
The entry of
Chad into the fight has taken the game to the terrorists since Chadian troops
are trained for assault, as opposed to Cameroon which has a defence oriented
military strategy. However, according
to Fethi Djebali, writing on the Andolu Agency (Turkey) website, “si les tirs de chasseurs bombardiers ont permis de repousser l’ennemi,
la région est toujours [dans] une forte insécurité[17]”. What more proof is
needed than the fact that the media continues to carry stories of wanton
killing?
II.2. Counter terrorism as opposed
to anti-terrorism
The US Army and
NATO define counter terrorism as "Operations
that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and
respond to terrorism” while anti-terrorism is defined by Black Swan
Security as “Anti-terrorism is defensive, intended to reduce the chance of an
attack using terrorist tactics at specific points, or to reduce the
vulnerability of possible targets to such tactics.”
Boko
Haram in Context: Map Showing Areas of Radical Islamist or Terrorist
Conflagration in Africa
Source: Copied
from Articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-31/world/39642133_1_northern-mali-boko-haram-nigerian-islamist.
Notice that Boko Haram became the third most active terrorist group in the
world between 2009 to 2013, coming only after the Taliban and Al Shabab[18].
This map also shows clearly that the neighbouring countries have to act join
Nigeria to ensure a coordinated response to Boko Haram while the entire world
community collaborates to avoid collaboration of Boko Haram with the other
terrorist groups shown.
Anti-terrorism
on its part refers to “defensive measures
used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts,
to include limited response and containment by local military forces[19]”.
Counter-terrorism means that terrorism needs to be fought using prevention and
mitigation. Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger need to collaborate and share
intelligence, although they can also benefit from help from superpowers like the USA, Russia, France in the form of
intelligence and superior equipment.
It has been
demonstrated above that both Nigeria and Cameroon have so far been defensive
and used an anti-terrorism approach to fighting Boko Haram with drastic
consequences for Nigeria, though Cameroon has fared better. Chad and Niger have
joined and Boko Haram has retaliated by attacking civilian targets, clearly it
is not enough to deploy troops to combat the insurgents on the front in the
Eastern Nigerian states. Okoli and
Iortyer recommend 5 series of actions:
1. Effective
network for intelligence gathering and analysis: infiltration, reconnaissance
including satellite, etc
2. Strategic
surveillance aimed at detecting membership, motivation, and operational
modalities of the sect
3. Clinical
investigation and prognostication of the socio-psychological and socio-economic
currents that underlie the emergence, growth and sustenance of the sect and its
activities
4. Identifying
and foreclosing sources of inspiration, funding and recruitment to the sect
5. Proactive
engagement of civil society stakeholders in the fight against the sect and,
6. Tactical
exploration of the diplomatic option in an attempt to come to terms with
legitimate (if any) grievances of the sect.
Conclusion
Having started
by examining the genesis of Boko Haram, briefly reviewing how it has involved,
we examined its current strategy which is based on 5 strategies of terrorism
(terrorism itself being a strategy or tactic used by extremist insurgents to
fight an asymmetrical war against a government or another form of authority):
attrition, provocation, outbidding, spoiling and intimidation, we proceeded to
observe that the containment strategy should be based on counter-terrorism
instead of anti-terrorism. It is now hoped that given the increased
sensitization and mobilisation of the international community that started
since April 2014 and continued with the President, Paul Biya, speech to the
diplomatic community describing Boko Haram as a global threat not to be left to
Cameroon and Nigeria alone, the recently organised CEAC summit that raised
additional funds and the AU pledge of troops in addition to others too minute
to list here, the countries would have mobilised enough capacity to proactively
neutralize the insurgency. Yet neutralising at the war front will not be enough
since it is important to understand why rational human beings can accept to
pick up arms and cause indiscriminate killing. The harm reaches far deeper into
the human psyche, into the culture, economics and history of these peoples and
only careful research and understanding followed by peacebuilding which also
includes economic emancipation and education can definitively deal with the
threat.
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[1]Guedegbe, B. C.: Boko Haram: Bras
armé du terrorisme international, déstabilisation du Nigeria et reconfiguration
géopolitique de la zone sahélienne. IRIS, Fervrier 2015, pg 1.
[2] Shekau was
second in command to Yusuf and is actually a leader of the most dynamic and
diligent faction based in North Eastern Nigeria. Other leaders include Maman
Nur who is said to be incharge of international operations and a rival to
Shekau.
[3] Amnesty
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2015. See Boko Haram at a Glance, access at https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2015/01/boko-haram-glance/ on 24/02/2015. Global Fire Power,
another organization estimates this number at 130,000 however and ranks Nigeria
as the 41 world power in terms of military strength. http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=nigeria on 24/02/2013.
[4] Baker Aryn,
Time Magazine: Nigeria’s Military Quails When Faced With Boko
Haram, accessed online on 24/02/2015
[5] Ford, J.:
The Origins of Boko Haram in National Interest Magazine, access on 24/02/2015
at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-origins-boko-haram-10609
[6] Pérouse de Montclos, Marc‐Antoine, « Boko Haram
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religieuse,
contestation politique ou protestation sociale ? », Questions de Recherche
(40/Juin 2012), Centre
d’études et de
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[7] Minteh, B.: Terrorism in West Africa – Boko Haram’s Evolution,
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[8] Minteh, B.: Opt. Cit. Page 9
[9]Dorell, O.: Boko Haram Facts and History, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/09/boko-haram-facts-history_n_5295563.html
on 20/02/2015.
[10] Kidd et Al. Page 66
[11] Kidd et Al. Opt. Cit. Page 20
[13] Minteh, B.: Opt. Cit. Page 10
[14] Obi, C. and Ezeogu, U.A. The Morality of Suicide Terrorism and Boko
Harma Challenges in Nigeria, Ujah Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities, Page
1.
[15] Djebali, F.: Lac Tchad: La strategie de
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[16] Okoli, A.C and Iortyer, P.: Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in
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[17] Djebali, F.: Opt. Cit.
[18] Tran Ngoc, Laetitia, Boko Haram – Fiche
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[19] http://www.terrorism-research.com/glossary/
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